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Aimed at academics and students interested in European integration, this book is based on
comprehensive new data from insider interviews, internal Commission documents and an the first database on
personal and structural Commission features since its founding days. This is a timely and rigorous contribution, finds
Muireann O’Dwyer. 
Which Policy for Europe? Power and Conflict Inside the European
Commission. Miriam Hartlapp, Julia Metz, and Christian
Rauh. Oxford University Press. 2014.
Find this book: 
This book seeks to explore the dynamic of decision making within the
European Commission. Co-authored by Miriam Hartlapp, Julia Metz
and Christian Ruath, the book sets out to examine the internal policy
contest of the Commission, and as such to add an extra layer of
analysis for studying EU policy making.
Rather than seeing the Commission as a unified actor, one whose
position can be taken as a given in explorations of policy making at EU
level, this book shows the role of politics within the Commission itself,
and explores the various structural and political factors which influence
the decision making process. Against the background of the increased
politicisation of the EU, and the expansion of the realm of EU
competences, this work is clearly very timely. This is a book that
marries incredibly rich data with innovative theoretical and
methodological approaches, which offers a nuanced understanding of
the politics within an EU institution that can no longer be honestly
described as non-political.
The books starts from a key puzzle: why is it that the European Commission proposes policies which are variably
unpopular with the other actors within the EU political system, or even generates proposals which are inconsistent
and even contradictory with earlier or concurrent proposals? These observations hint at a complexity that is not
captured by models of EU decision making that take the Commission as a unitary actor. The central question of this
book, then, asks why does the Commission come to a particular position, and how is that position formulated?
In order to explore this, the authors set out a theoretical framework based on the main competing position formation
logics found in the literature. They create a typology, breaking down the conceptualisation of the Commission into
three views. Firstly, is that of the Commission as a technocratic problem solver, utilising the best expertise and
operating apart from politics. Secondly, the Commission as bureaucratic competence maximiser, seeking to
increase its areas of influence and its relative power within the EU structure. Thirdly, the view of the Commission as
an ideologically motivated policy seeker.  Throughout the book it becomes clear that the evidence presented
supports the latter two logics to a greater extent than the former. Indeed, the book makes a compelling argument
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against the view of the Commission as non-political. Rather, they present a Commission that is very much part of the
politics of the EU, influencing and being influenced by the wider political actors and circumstances.
This consideration of politics leads to the second part of the theoretical framework – that of the constraints on policy
formation. These constraints are listed as, firstly, the legal status quo – the ways in which the existing legal
architecture and existing legislation limits the realm of potential proposals. Second are the structures of internal co-
ordination, the implications of the structure of the Commission itself, from the division of policy areas, to the
hierarchy between the administration of the Commission and the more political college of Commissioners. The third
aspect which constrains policy formation is the inter-institutional structure of the EU – the relationships between the
Commission and the Council, Parliament, the Court of Justice and so on. The authors also offer a fourth category
which acts as a catch all for the more area specific constraints: the role of organised interests, experts, and the
relative individual power of actors involved. Brought together, the typology of position formation logics and the
constraints on policy formation create a theoretical framework against which the case studies are examined.
This book offers a very rich exploration of the internal process of policy formation. Focusing on the lifespan of two
recent Commissions, the book covers 48 cases, with each case representing a distinct policy formation. The cases
are grouped under three headings: Consumer Policy, Research and Innovation Policy, and policies at the
intersection of Social Policy and the Common Market. Relying on a mixture of data sources, these case studies offer
an interesting insight into the work of the Commission, and form the empirical backbone of the argument.
Following on from the case studies, the book develops an analysis of the Commission as a whole, drawing out key
characteristics of the internal policy creation process. The three aspects discussed are the role of expert groups, the
influence of public opinion and public acceptability, and the question of whether there are structural biases inherent
in the internal co-ordination of the Commission. It is in these chapters that the thick description provided by the case
studies can really be brought to bear. Each addresses a key question about how decisions are made in the
Commission, and as they follow on from the focused specificity of the case studies, the analysis here is very well
grounded in the empirical data. The question of whether or not there are structural biases within the Commission is
a crucial one. Given the debates over the “joint decision trap”, whereby negative integration is seen as outpacing
positive integration as a result of the structure of the EU, to find a similar structural bias within one of the key
institutions would further the concern over the market bias in EU policy making. The analysis offered here is quite
nuanced – rather than making an overall claim, the book highlights the ways in which the interaction between
different policy domains, as well as between the administrative and political levels, does create certain biases
towards particular types of integration. Further work, perhaps deepening the conversation between work of this type
and the literature on the joint decision trap would be a clear next step.
Overall, this is a timely and rigorous book. Its insights are the result of an innovative theoretical approach, as well as
a very rich collection of data. By successfully refuting the idea that the Commission can be viewed as a unitary actor,
this book has clear implications for the study of European policymaking more broadly. As more and more important
decisions are taken at the European level, it is academics, activists and politicians who should be paying close
attention to these arguments.
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